Del Bosque takes an hour to find the keys in Georgia

The way to reach a World Cup is not easy, much as most rivals being touched one in grace are selections that have little say in football history. Vicente del Bosque was released as national coach classifying Spain for the World Cup 2010 South Africa won every game, without exception, a mash that was repeated in the qualifying round of the European Championship this year, to which La Roja came without yielding a measly tie. But numbers deceive and hide evidence as difficult as the last night in Georgia.

Not that the match played at the Boris Pachaidze be difficult in itself, rather it was Spain that was complicated and, specifically, their coach. Del Bosque poorly planned the party, opting for a side that provided to Georgia its only possible strategy, putting the bus. The double pivot in yesterday's games is no longer than necessary, is that it is a complete ineffectiveness. That Busquets and Alonso have to always play together begins to seem a matter of stubbornness or, not being so poorly designed, a matter of not being able to see beyond.

Defender playing philosophy is something praiseworthy. All great teams in history have this in common: reliance on a game idea. But this can not go where the equipment is to become a victim of his own philosophy, practice and forget that look just the theoretical question, which always leave positive accounts. Ketsbaia, Georgian coach, Spain had the usual: double pivot, and much game long side first touch but always in the middle. His answer was expected: 4-5-1 bus version.

The Red, meanwhile, played with a 4-3-3 formation, which could well be considered a 4-5-1, but light years away from Georgia in terms of positioning on the field. In five minutes the first symptom was already clear: left over Alonso and Busquets. A short time later, after his first two climbs, another symptom: why Arbeloa plays instead of Juanfran if our right-back has to stay longer in enemy territory than your own? Between one thing and another Spain lost forces, options and intentions.

Alonso, who is one of those players who always look for the team rather than their personal brilliance, was forced several times last night to take a difficult decision away. As Spain siege planted around the perimeter of the Georgian double defensive wall, Alonso realized that advancing its position to that area all I did was add a scale in the transition from one side to another of his team. So, again and again, what he did was sacrifice to not disturb.

Here comes another Forest decision difficult to understand: it is Busquets pivot that sneaks over the opponent's area. Many times it does chasing a rival (or more), pushing off the ball, which makes it is its very nature. But with the outage of ideas in attack sufferer Busi area near the enemy, is not it better that he was responsible for maintaining the position more and therefore have more freedom Alonso to advance and take advantage of its excellent shot?

For Arbeloa is incomprehensible. The right side is one of the two positions in which La Roja played with someone who is not among the five best in the world (the other is the point of attack today Villa, Torres, Soldado, Negredo and Llorente are not in the top 5 worldwide). If the side Salamanca was a defensive expert could understand his undisputed title, but it is not. In a game that is expected to dominate from beginning to end, playing most of the time on field rival Juanfran should have been chosen, the side that would have given Spain a lot more breadth, depth and combination.

Between one thing and another, Spain was the first game when getting into a funnel in the neck of which waited six or seven Georgians. 80% of possession (record of Spain) did not translate into a number of occasions. Xavi and Iniesta fed continuously to Silva, who sought again and again to see if, between them, managed to string together a rally between a dozen Georgian legs. But little was taken out clean. Nevertheless, Spain could get ahead on several occasions, with several middle-distance shots (one of which, the canary, hit the post) and a heads-up that marró Soldier.

After the break Georgia nearly complicate matters further Del Bosque: brushed the goal with a shot that repelled timber (another advantage of having a saint among the sticks). The coach began to move the bench at ten minutes after the break, which is a one-hour delay in reading the game: first dispensed with Busquets and, introducing Peter, Spain finally disposed of someone who knew what to do with the ball on the right wing. And finally, after a change of soda Cazorla for Silva, it was decided to send Arbeloa sit and give input to Cesc. It was the 34th minute of the second half and finally Spain in the field provided a good plan to attack Georgian double wall. Defense of three, one pivot (Alonso), three midfielders (Xavi, Cazorla and Iniesta) and three attackers (Pedro, Cesc and Soldier).

With that goal came last Trio. Pedro faces and only with the threat that is earned over time and space to see that the local defense had forgotten for a moment from Cesc. Fabregas received the ball and, first, put a soldier, who took advantage of the disorder to find his second Georgian candid shot throughout the match. This not failed. The 0-1 finish reminds the Spanish style in South Africa: the goal like a pike in Flanders that marks the design of the battle.

When Spain achieved the ticket to Brazil will be difficult for us to remember how hard it was to start the journey with a victory in Georgia. Our lack of memory may be a good sign, since we'll have filled with other parties happier. Way is the way to a World Cup full of little big difficulties just forgetting. The not to forget about last night's Del Bosque: if the team decided on the last leg of the match was the one who won, why not opt ​​for early for him instead of hastily boot always the same?